The World's Sheriff Needs a New Weapon

There were no triumphal marches down Pennsylvania Avenue, no ecstatic embraces like on VJ Day, no TV anchors putting on their grave momentous-moment voices – not even a small historical marker. But Tuesday was the day that America, for better or for worse, entered the Post-Iraq Era.

In Baghdad Monday, General Ray Odierno, the U.S. commander, announced that everything was on schedule for the full withdrawal of American military forces from Iraqi cities by the end of June. But the true symbolic milestone was Barack Obama's joint press conference Tuesday morning with visiting South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. Iraq was never mentioned, but more than seven years after George W. Bush grandiosely created the Axis of Evil, the two surviving Axis powers (North Korean and Iran) received star billing.

Obama's carefully chosen words ranged from the stern about North Korean nukes ("Belligerent, provocative behavior...will be met with significant, serious enforcement of sanctions") to the subdued about the Iranian election ("I have deep concerns about the election -- and I think the world has deep concerns about the election.") But what was telling was not the president's rhetoric but America's scant leverage to disarm North Korea and democratize Iran. And what was even more surprising was the bipartisan consensus recognizing the limits of American power.

The news Tuesday from Iran was mostly bleak, from the reported arrests of more than 100 opposition leaders to tight restrictions on the ability of foreign journalists to report anything beyond the paint color of their office walls. Americans with long memories can recall other moments when prudence required passivity as the sprigs of democracy were stomped by military boots – in Prague in 1968, in Warsaw in 1981 and, of course, in Beijing in 1989.

At his press conference, Obama confirmed the surprisingly firm resolve of the Security Council (including China) to challenge on the high seas North Korean ships suspected of exporting nuclear technology. While no attempts will be made to physically board these ships, they will be followed to their next port, where efforts will be made to inspect the cargo. Yes, of course, this new policy could be porous. But it represents a significantly tougher response than the economic sanctions that have done so little to deter Pyongyang's nuclear ambitions.

Neither the Clinton nor the Bush administrations could ever free themselves from the beguiling but naïve notion that North Korea could be bribed into submission on the nuclear question. As Obama said tartly Tuesday, "There's been a pattern in the past where North Korea behaves in a belligerent fashion, and if it waits long enough, is then rewarded with foodstuffs and fuel and concessionary loans." The president then added – in words that could come back to haunt him if he softens – "We are going to break that pattern."

While Republicans like John McCain may prefer tougher language in support of Iran's democratic aspirations and conservative hawks might want to become more aggressive in confronting North Korean shipping, there are few high-decibel arguments raging over diplomatic or military strategy. It is not that Obama has miraculously bridged the deep fissures in American politics over the use of military force. Rather, the difference lies in the type of foreign policy crises facing Obama.

Beginning with the Cold War, America's domestic political battles over foreign policy have all been fought along the grid of fight versus negotiate, strong versus weak, tear down that wall versus nuclear freeze. A true-false question pollsters ask to gauge national security attitudes is: "The best way to ensure peace is through military strength." Over the last 20 years, the public has been consistently more hawkish ("True") than dovish ("False") on this question, according to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. In the April version of this survey, 75 percent of Republicans but only 43 percent of Democrats believed in "peace through military strength."

But military strength has absolutely nothing to do with the fate of the limited democracy granted to Iranians. And, while the American Navy may play a major role in challenging North Korean shipping, the policy is only made possible by the cooperation of the Chinese in the Security Council. The other fearsome foreign policy puzzle – what to do to support Pakistan's battle against Taliban militants in the Swat Valley – also does not lend itself to traditional military remedies.

Each of these three countries (Iran, North Korea and Pakistan) is as much of a riddle wrapped up in an enigma as the Soviet Union ever was. The Politburo was an open book compared to deciphering the decision making of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iran's other religious leaders. Sorting out the connection between North Korea's nuclear tests and the succession crisis brought on Kim Jong-Il's apparent stroke and failing health defies any foreign policy expert with an ounce of humility. And even though Pakistan is a (very weak) democracy, the subterranean ties between the Pakistani security services and the Taliban make it difficult to figure out the game of shadows in the frontier provinces.

After the Iraqi debacle over the mythical weapons of mass destruction, there should be a cautionary are-you-sure hesitation before America again acts on "slam dunk" intelligence. But in many ways, these three countries – two with nuclear weapons and the third somewhere on the road to a bomb – are as opaque as Saddam Hussein's Iraq. With limited military options and a black hole when it comes to intelligence, America's superpower status does not do much to safeguard stability in some of the most volatile spots on the globe.

To put it loosely, there have been three phases of American foreign policy since the Berlin Wall was broken into souvenir chunks of concrete. There was the idyllic-in-hindsight 1990s when America was unchallenged except financially. The horrors of 9/11 quickly morphed into the whack-a-mole America Unchained excesses of the Bush administration.

Now with Obama, we are entering an era of leverage, when the problems confronting the nation (and the world) require new diplomatic, military and financial tools. There is no guarantee that this new phase will be any easier – or America will be any more successful in promoting peace and democracy. But maybe, just maybe, it is time to retire the old tired arguments about who is the toughest sheriff in the world.